PAVE Training Module 2

Source: PAVE Project. ‘’Ardit Orana: How the Internet Supports Extremist Narratives and Radicalization.’’ 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Be-zR-nXPY.

Photo Source: Cvetkovska, S. (2 November 2021). Trump and COVID-19 Fuel North Macedonia’s Clickbait Boom.  Resonate Voices Initiative. https://resonantvoices.info/trump-and-covid-19-fuel-north-macedonias-clickbait-boom/.

One of the primary uses of the Internet by terrorists is for the dissemination of propaganda. Propaganda is the systemic dissemination of information, especially in a biased or misleading way, in order to promote a political/social cause or point of view. The promotion of violence is a common theme in terrorism-related propaganda, and it generally takes the form of multimedia communications providing ideological or practical instruction, explanations, justifications or promotion of terrorist activities. These may include virtual messages, presentations, magazines, treatises, audio and video files and video games developed by terrorist organizations or sympathizers.  Internet propaganda may also include content such as video footage of violent acts of terrorism or video games developed by terrorist organizations that simulate acts of terrorism and encourage the user to engage in role-play, by acting the part of a virtual terrorist. 

Other objectives of terrorist propaganda may include the use of psychological manipulation to undermine an individual’s belief in certain collective social values, or to propagate a sense of heightened anxiety, fear or panic in a population or subset of the population. This may be achieved through the dissemination of disinformation, rumors, threats of violence or images relating to provocative acts of violence. The intended audience may include direct viewers of content, as well as those affected by potential publicity generated by such material.

Extremists use context-specific propaganda to reach and influence audiences. It is more effective when:

• Displayed in a local language. This is especially relevant for members of the diaspora feel comfortable with, i.e., German or English.
• Creates a role model that recruits can identify with. ISIS created role models for women, which did not exist before. 
• Sharing images or rhetoric with a negative connotation associated towards a particular group.  Often in Europe, there is the spread of different negative images from Islam and Muslims. 
• Online content dissemination of violence abuse amongst teenagers and young adults that encourage change to cultural and social norms.
• Daily interaction with violence in video games, movies, comics, etc. creates an essence of violence normality. 

• Insights fear of the ‘other.’

Let's look at an example: 

Photo Source: Al Hayat Media Center

The ISIS recruitment video titled “No Life Without Jihad,” was released by the Al Hayat Media Center, which is an ISIS-affiliated group focused on recruiting Muslims in western countries.  

The 13-minute video features a British and Australian man — sitting next to other alleged ISIS members — who identifies himself as Brother Abu Muthanna al Yemeni extolling the virtues of jihad. He encourages foreign Muslims “to answer the call of Allah and his messenger when he calls you to what gives you life…what he says gives you life is jihad.”

Let's look at what tactics were used in creating this video:

• Creates a role model that recruits can identify with, as well as shares positive aspects to joining the group: The video encourages ‘loyal’ followers to come to the Middle East to ‘reconquer Muslim land’ and allows viewers to hear and see first-hand the ‘glamorization’ of life by those have been actively engaged in the extremist organization. The video also features foreign fighters from Western nations who have joined the group. 
• The “message to the brothers who have stayed behind” is a strong, sustained, and emotional appeal to Western Muslims to join ISIS immediately, and seeks to remove every possible excuse, such as work, family, comfort, for not going. The video connects the need for immediate sacrifice for the sake of suffering Muslims in Syria to a long-awaited millenarian hope. 
• Displayed in a local language: The video was shared on accounts in German and French - allowing the video to be understood by, and targeted to, a larger audience. 

Another tactic used by violent extremists is through spreading online hate speech. Hate speech covers many forms of expressions which advocate, incite, promote or justify hatred, violence and discrimination against a person or group of persons for a variety of reasons. As more and more people have moved online, experts say, individuals inclined toward racism, misogyny, or homophobia have found niches that can reinforce their views and goad them to violence. Social media platforms also offer violent actors the opportunity to publicize their acts. Hate speech on the internet is not a new phenomenon, but rather the digitalization of cultural backlash politics against processes of cultural change and progress.

Hate speech can also be derived from far-right groups. For instance, created in Britain in 2017 as an alternative to YouTube, BitChute has become notorious for videos promoting racism, hate and Holocaust-denial. In the Summer of 2020, twenty of the most popular videos on the platform were a mix of extreme racist propaganda and harmful disinformation, mostly originating from QAnon and anti-vaxxer groups. The site is used throughout the Western Balkans, with individuals sharing content from BitChute, including translated videos that claim the COVID-19 pandemic is fake and the vaccines dangerous, have also taken part in protests against COVID-19 restrictions imposed by authorities in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkan region. In Serbia and Croatia, they have joined protests against migrants and refugees and LGBTQ rights. 

Extremist groups are using conspiracy theories and other content on far-right channels as a tool to recruit followers and spread radical agendas, abusing the insecurity, fear, socioeconomic problems and mental health issues of vulnerable individuals.

What are some examples of online hate speech inspiring acts of violence?

• Extremist propaganda displays the war in Bosnia as an attack by the West on the Islamic world, thereby establishing a direct connection to Islamist ideology in the interpretation of the conflict. 

• Online hate speech targets Iraqi journalists and activists leading to targeted threats directly inciting violence against them.

Photo Source: Civil Media. “TikTok fight for inter-ethnic and political struggle.” 2020. https://civilmedia.mk/tik-tok-tepachka-za-meguetnichka-i-politichka-presmetka/.

During the summer and fall of 2020, a new trend highlighting the region’s conflicts emerged in the Balkans. In these videos, a group of people walk along a street. A bully appears, harassing them. Suddenly, a friend emerges to fight off the bully. Different users attach different flags to the bully and to the savior. The flag reflects the user’s view of conflict and cooperation in the Balkans. In one video, the group consists of Kosovo and Macedonia, with Serbia as the bully and Albania the savior. In another combination, Albania is the bully and Serbia is the defender. The cathartic part of the video is accompanied by dramatic music, reinforcing the message.

Have you noticed or seen any of the tactics described above? If so, how did you know? How did it make you feel?

Extremist groups will engage with anyone they feel may be able to be susceptible to their messaging - ranging from youth to adults and everywhere in between.  From an outside perspective, it is easy for us to categorize anyone recruited online as ‘gullible’ or ‘naïve’, but this is simply not the case. In fact, many people who become influenced or radicalized by online propaganda did not seek it out—they were intentionally targeted and unaware of the radicalization agenda.  

Radicalization is more widespread where conditions of inequality and political frustration prevail. It often takes root in people who sympathize with the plight of the oppressed and wish to show their solidarity. It also looks to capitalize on people’s vulnerabilities and insecurities and connect them with like-minded individuals to give them a sense of community and belonging within an online space.

Humans intrinsically search for a sense of belonging. Social media sites allow for introverts and extroverts alike to communicate with others - whenever they like - and generally along topics of interest. A filter bubble can cause users to have significantly less contact with contradicting viewpoints, causing the user to become intellectually isolated and in a ‘bubble’ of their own beliefs and perceptions related to political and social ideologies. Personalized search results on Google and personalized news streams on Facebook are two perfect examples of this phenomenon.

Let's look more at how extremists create a sense of belonging and capitalize on filter bubbles: Chat rooms offer a place for individuals to engage in networking and connectivity opportunities, often amongst people with similar ideas. This space reinforces interpersonal relationships and creates a sense of belonging. However, extremists have also been known to share information on these platforms, such as photos, videos, blogs, guides, etc. Additionally, these spaces are easy for group mobilization through exploiting collective identities or through relational and emotional bonds in order to achieve endorsement of extremist values.

In Tunisia, PAVE research found many webpages claiming a ‘primary belonging,’ through a regional identity, such as Abnaou Al Janoub' (people of southern Tunisia). This claim represents a certain type of solidarity, which is more or less temporary, but can be revived at any time, following any incident, decision or simple event. 

Source: DARE. ‘’How Important Are Online Spaces to Radicalization.’’ June, 2021. https://www.dare-h2020.org/uploads/1/2/1/7/12176018/rb_-_online_spaces_final_version.pdf.

This method of engagement by extremists is through a method known as narrowcasting. 

Narrowcasting aims messages at specific segments of the public defined by values, preferences, demographic attributes, or subscription. An online page, video, or chat’s name, images, appeals, and information are tailored to match the profile of a particular social group. In short, it is disseminating information to a smaller group rather than a wide audience.  

For instance, in Lebanon, the PAVE project noted youth resorted mostly to online media and communication channels specifically in their search for reassurance and guidance. They believed that their new affiliation would provide them with a sense of belonging and identity given the void in collective belonging. 

Watch this example of a young man interacting with an extremist via a video game:

Source: Devon County Council. ‘’Safer Devon: Online Radicalization.’’ November 2, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHmOnCRAGvw&t=33s.

Hear from Athina Tzemprin, Manager at Moonshot on how women and youth become key targets for online radicalization and recruitment.

Source: PAVE Project. ‘’Athina Tzemprin: Women and Youth as Targets for Online Radicalization and Recruitment.’’ 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9ll92gpi9eI.

Youth are generalized as most involved and active within violent extremist groups, but research and implementation experience have shown that only a small portion of young people who are vulnerable to violent extremism actually become violent. However, as youth are often key users of the internet and broadly susceptible to propaganda, the internet, therefore, is an effective mechanism for youth radicalization and recruitment. The PAVE research highlighted “the majority of youth in Kosovo, prior to going to Syria, had developed the majority of their radical ties through social media, not traditional media.”

Around the world, youth are becoming radicalized and recruited by extremist organizations. In 2015 alone, the United Nations verified 274 cases of children having been recruited by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations verified the existence of centers in rural Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and rural Raqqah that provided military training to at least 124 boys between 10 and 15 years of age. Verification of the use of children as foreign fighters has increased significantly, with 18 cases involving children as young as 7 years of age. The use of children as child executioners was reported and appeared in video footage. In Iraq, in two incidents in June and September 2015, more than 1,000 children were reportedly abducted by ISIL from Mosul district. These figures are likely to be significant underestimates because of the limited opportunities to gain access and monitor violations against children.

Grooming

One tactic extremists use to engage and recruit youth is through ‘grooming.’ Grooming is when someone builds a relationship, trust and emotional connection with a child or young person so they can manipulate, exploit and abuse them. While the drivers and objectives are different, the actual process of grooming is broadly similar to radicalization, with the exploitation of a person’s vulnerability usually being the critical factor. Those who are targeted are often offered something ideological, such as an eternal spiritual reward, or sometimes something physical, such as an economic incentive, that will make them 'feel better' about themselves or their situation. People who groom and radicalize also use the anonymity of the web as a layer of protection to avoid detection. The added ability to encrypt communication can make law enforcement extremely difficult. A predator may use the internet to offer support, friendship and belonging are all used to gain influence and control, so it’s important to be alert. Despite the best efforts of social media providers and platforms, the sheer volume of web traffic means that questionable content can be uploaded and distributed for a considerable length of time. 

It’s critical to point out that extremists use lots of different channels to try to connect with someone who they think could be vulnerable and persuadable. They will look at posts, likes and shares and social media profiles and friend lists to identify people to target. The ways young people are recruited however, vary widely across contexts, gender, and other identity factors; often with extremists capitalizing on feelings of insecurity, discrimination, or social isolation. 

Online Recruitment of Girls and Young Women

For example, online recruitment of girls and young women is proportionately more prevalent than their male counterparts as they often face restrictions in public spaces due to societal gender norms.  Factors contributing to young women joining extremist organizations include: rejection of Western feminism; online contact with recruiters who offer marriage and adventure; peer or family influence; adherence to the ideology and politics; naivety and romantic optimism; and the chance to be part of something new, exciting and illicit. 

Extremist groups and pages on social media that are specifically targeted at young women tend to be very colorful, often including internet-famous cat and dog videos to generate attention. 

For young men, extremist groups may play off of their desire to ' belong.’ For instance, this quest for significance gets personal when ISIS directly challenges a male’s masculinity and shames him to join their cause or commit attacks in the West. It gets especially personal when one considers the messengers along with the message. 

For example, one of ISIS’ latest propaganda videos features a French-language a cappella chant containing footage of young children dressed in military fatigues, fully armed, and marching in bombed out city streets. The video was accompanied by lyrics declaring, “Our warriors are everywhere ready to sacrifice themselves, beware our orphans are growing.” In another video, potential recruits are encouraged to join up and fight alongside ISIS militants while a picture of a young boy holding an assault rifle is shown as the words “What’s your excuse?” flash across the screen. ISIS’ use of child soldiers in their propaganda videos plays on the discomfort many men experience at the thought of a child being more empowered than themselves to avenge Muslims’ perceived humiliation.

 Click the link to watch the video: https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/isis-threat/video-isis-child-jihadists-sing-in-french-your-blood-will-flow-452968 

Source: The Jerusalem Post. ‘’ISIS child jihadists sing in French - 'Your blood will flow.’’ May 3, 2016. https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/isis-threat/video-isis-child-jihadists-sing-in-french-your-blood-will-flow-452968.

Female ISIS supporters also use narratives of shame and emasculation to reach out to and recruit impressionable “fence sitters” who have not yet taken decisive action. For instance, a 2015 tweet by a user named @UsofNuh declared, “There are women who are already here before you and look, they are already doing more than you have for the Islamic State.”

Memes

Violent extremists are supplementing their traditional messaging—which can rely heavily on lengthy, academic-style recitations and philosophical arguments—with memes that are faster and easier to consume. Such content allows quick sharing of vast amounts of information with like-minded end users and can normalize or lessen the gravity of violent extremist narratives. It is important for first responders to understand how violent extremist narratives are being spread using memes, while also respecting constitutionally protected rights and appreciating that the memes discussed in this paper (or others like them) may be shared by those who are not connected to violent extremism.

Photo Source: Liang, C. and Cross, J. (July 2020). ‘White Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet.’ Geneva Centre for Security Policy. https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/white-crusade-how-to-prevent-right-wing-extremists-from-exploiting-the-internet.

Pepe the Frog, an internet meme, serves as an example to subversive exposure of a meme (an image that is meant to be  funny and subversively evocative but also gets the viewer to think about whether the views they had been taught are true, or if alternative facts are available). ‘Pepe’ the cartoon frog, created for humor on a non-political site, became appropriated as a popular figure in far-right circles. Recent appropriations of Pepe as Hitler, a Klansman, and multiple racist caricatures has earned the frog a spot in the American Defamation League hate symbols database. But what gives memes like Pepe their power is their ability to spread messages quickly. Because they use widely recognizable visuals and text formulas to pass their message (referencing famous movies, pop culture, famous political events), they are effective at generating ‘lols.’ Whether their content is comedic and light-hearted or angry and nihilistic, they make the viewer laugh and easy to consume no matter the message. Memes, whichever way they are generated, can effectively convey a message to millions of people across the world and are incredibly effective at targeting youth on sites like Reddit or Instagram. The result of this is a format for disseminating information virally, regardless of its veracity. 

PAVE research demonstrated within the MENA region, that a “huge number of media outputs and activity shows the extremist organizations’ ability to employ social networks for two primary purposes: ideological propaganda and demonstration of greatness and strength. This attracted many young people from the Majdal Anjar region in Lebanon as they were watching many of these [video] releases and telling their friends about them. They would meet to watch together the videos and documentaries issued by the Islamic State, with the same excitement of friends gathering to go to the cinema. 

While youth may be one of the most susceptible stakeholder groups to radicalization, we need to remember that they are also key partners to design and implement preventing and countering extremism programming and policies. We will circle back to this in section 2!

Interested in learning more? Check out PAVE Training Module 3: ‘Advancing Inclusivity in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Efforts.’ 

While a disproportionately high number of males are in extremist groups, women are still susceptible to radicalization and recruitment for a range of reasons similar to men’s, ranging from search for employment or economic independence, family revenge, ideological persuasion or a sense of belonging. In many cases, women and young women experience limited freedoms in offline settings shaped by cultural norms and/or family pressure, which can result in a lack of education and employment opportunities. Limited social ties with peers or opportunities outside the home often lead women and young women to increase engagement in online spaces. 

In fact, the number of women implicated in terrorism-related crimes is growing. In 2017, the Global Extremism Monitor registered 100 distinct suicide attacks conducted by 181 female militants, 11% of all incidents that year. In 2016, women constituted 26% of those arrested on terrorism charges in Europe, up from 18% the year before. Given that radicalization is often the culmination of economic, social, and political factors and all of these processes are gendered, so is the pathway of radicalization and disengagement from violent extremism. For example, content, messages and language are characterized by gender stereotypes and/or promote strict gender segregation. Modern extremist groups use social media to actively enlist women into supportive roles, reaching unprecedented numbers through narrowcasting—creating a targeted message for a specific subgroup. For instance, the Islamic State’s concerted campaign to recruit Western women emphasized camaraderie, sisterhood, and opportunities to enjoy freedom and adventure as state-builders.

Terrorist groups also appeal to women through creative outlets. For instance, Al Qaeda released a magazine focusing on women’s jihadist style called Al-Shamikha, which loosely translates to “the majestic woman.” The magazine that offers home and beauty tips alongside testimonials from the wives of suicide bombers and female jihadists. Inside, next to advice on suicide attacks and waging electronic warfare, readers can also find tips on “marrying a mujahideen” or how to get the perfect complexion.

Source: Cover Page of al-Shamikha. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/militant-imagery-project/0300/.

Women also serve as influencers for other women, as well as actual recruiters. One study of online pro–Islamic State groups found that female recruiters had higher network connectivity than men, making them more effective at spreading the Islamic State’s message than their male counterparts— an important finding given that an increasing number of extremists are radicalized online. Women’s participation also improved the survival rate of online pro–Islamic State groups, extending the time before technology companies shut them down. PAVE research shows that while women in the Western Balkans are not actively engaged as vectors of radicalizing messages compared to men, fieldwork has shown that they actively participate in online platforms disseminating radical content. As noted in the case of North Macedonia, there are specific online platform groups and channels dedicated to exclusive content aimed at fostering radical ideologies among women. 

Women’s roles vary within P/CVE efforts. Women and young women can be perpetrators and recruiters, as well as preventers and peacebuilders, which puts them also at risk in their activism. And while both men and women can experience incidents of online violence and abuse, women and young women are considerably more likely to be victims of repeated and severe forms of harmful actions online or with the help of technology. Online hate speech and threats within online spaces may be linked to political and ideological positions or stemming from patriarchal systems embedded in local societies. This may include online abuse, harassment, and gendered defamation via social media platforms. Not only does the language incite psychological or even physical harm, it also silences women, limiting their right to express themselves freely and without fear, and deters them from digital participation in political, social and cultural life. Often, it forces women to retreat from the internet and to socially isolate.

Here are six common trends identified of digital violence against women and other marginalized groups include:

• Online attacks with clear manifestation of hate speech
• Online attacks that follow domestic violence
• Online attacks that lead to physical violence
• Online attacks that include or lead to privacy breaches
• Online attacks on publicly exposed women groups, in particular journalists and politicians
• Online attacks on already vulnerable groups, in particular minorities, migrants and members of the LGBTQ community

PVAE research in the MENA region revealed that gender has been disregarded as a cross-cutting element in assessing community vulnerability and resilience towards violent extremism. As the Lebanese case shows, PAVE interviewees, “did not acknowledge or even recognize the gender dimension” in relation to violent extremism, radicalization, and deradicalization! Efforts must be increased to ensure this lens is included in online P/CVE efforts.

Interested in learning more and how to make your P/CVE efforts inclusive of women and young women? Check out PAVE Training Module 3: ‘Advancing Inclusivity in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Efforts.’ 

Here from Kassim Kassir, a journalist, on how collaboration is key to mitigate the increase of violent extremism, especially that which is religiously motivated. 

Source: PAVE Project. ''Kassim Kassir: Identifying Extremist Propaganda and Recruitment Content in Online Spaces.'' 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tmGzuLiGOqA.

The PAVE project noted that many communities perceive that ethno-political radicalization poses a higher risk to societal peace compared to religiously inspired radicalization. However, they are not mutually exclusive and religious identity is utilized by ethno-political discourses to strengthen a sense of “othering”. While religion may play a factor for some, it is not the primary reason one may be radicalized or recruited. Some individuals may feel constrained or uninterested in the limited range of perspectives and interpretations of religion provided by religious institutions and even family. More radical interpretations of religion are readily available in online spaces. Many young people are starting to move away from traditional institutional teachings and older generational leadership, being more in favor of online forms of content or leaders.  

The potential of the internet has become a primary concern for policymakers and tech companies alike, and changed the way in which national security threats are investigated. These entities are increasingly aware of the importance of the internet in radicalization techniques. Major tech firms have been accused of failing to adjust algorithms that accelerate violent extremism and lawmakers have accused executives at social media firms of consistently prioritizing growth and revenue over safety and security. Advocates of direct governmental regulation present a straightforward narrative of companies failing to meet their responsibility to police terrorist content on their platforms, and governments intervening with strict parameters, hefty fines, and legal penalties to force them into compliance.

However, the success and scale of the operations of violent extremist groups is dependent on the financial, physical and ideological support of sympathetic communities. It is not uncommon for terrorist organizations to obtain support through government supporters. In addition, religious leaders do not exist in isolation from politics. Many of the leaders are political appointments and are often not an accurate representation of their constituents and beliefs. As such, they may perpetuate a sectarian system that inhibits the social integration of all and continue to suppress diversity of religions, which can lead to corruption and dissemination of harmful rhetoric. 

Deradicalization requires effective tools to counter radicalization starting from counter narratives. Policymakers in MENA and the Western Balkans have yet to formulate an effective policy concerning online deradicalization; simply shutting down social networks with radical content or removing such content is not effective. However, it is important for policy makers to acknowledge that they may not always be best positioned to officially disseminate counter narratives. This nuance makes collaboration between policy makers, religious actors and civil society all more critical.

Despite shortcomings, policymakers and governments have strived to support counter-efforts to online radicalization and recruitment. For instance, government of the United Kingdom created the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) to coordinate efforts with private sector industries to remove illegal content, from videos of violence with messages of glorification for terrorists to bomb-making instructions.  More than 30 UN member states have created a national action plan to prevent violent extremism. A majority of these documents contain provisions for governments to combat extremism in all its forms, including in online spaces. 

However, additional efforts must be made through regional cooperation between governments and local actors such as NGOs, scholars and journalists must strongly advocate for legal and institutional reforms to be able to tackle extremism, and right-wing extremism (RWE). Advocating for rule of law enforcement should be a priority, such as advocacy for severe punishment of online or in-person violence and incidents by RWE activists, incrimination of the activities and banning of RWE organizations that have the potential for violence. Smaller community-based organizations should be empowered for operational and advocacy activities. 

Raising awareness of online risks for extremism is important. Development of online preventive measures by local stakeholders for countering toxic but “borderline” RWE expressions, and more effective countering of fake news and conspiracy theories with straightforward messages and answers, suitable to young and old, are needed.

Hear from Samiha Hamdi, a researcher at the University of Sfax, on how civil society, religious actors and policy makers can collaborate to reduce online violence.

Source: PAVE Project. ''Samiha Hamdi: How Civil Society, Religious Actors and Policymakers Collaborate to Reduce Online Violence. 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU61AERI1vc.

Digital Technology and Extremist Use

• Aaron Smith and Joanna Brenner, 2012.  “Twitter Use 2012,” Pew Internet & American Life Project., www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/ Twitter-Use-2012.aspx.

• American Defamation League. 2022. ‘Propaganda, Extremism and Online Recruitment Tactics.’ 2016. https://www.adl.org/education/resources/tools-and-strategies/table-talk/propaganda-extremism-online-recruitment

• Behr Von, I., Reding, A. Edwards, E., Gribbon, L. (2013). radicalization in the digital era The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf 

• Dino, Daniel. (2019). E-Recruits: How Gaming is Helping Terrorist Groups Radicalize and Recruit a Generation of Online Gamers.  Centric. https://www.concentric.io/blog/e-recruits-how-gaming-is-helping-terrorist-groups-radicalize-and-recruit-a-generation-of-online-gamers

• Examining Social Media Companies’ Efforts to Counter On-Line Terror Content and Misinformation. (2019). Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives. June 26, 2019. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-116hhrg38783/html/CHRG-116hhrg38783.htm

• Farinelli, F. (2021). Conspiracy Theories and Right-Wing Extremism -  Insights and Recommendations for P/CVE. RAN Network. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/ran_conspiracy_theories_and_right-wing_2021_en.pdf

• Ferguson, Katelyn. 15 March 2021. “The Role of Video Games and Online Platforms in Terrorist Radicalization and Recruitment.” Counter Terrorism Group. https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/the-role-of-video-games-and-online-platforms-in-terrorist-radicalization-and-recruitment 

• Hoyle, C. Bradford, A and Frenett, R. (2015). Becoming Mulan?: Female Western Migrants to ISIS. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. http:// isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15 _WEB.pdf

• Jakupi, R. and Kelmendi, V. (March 2019.) Countering the Myths of IS. Kosovar Centre for Security Studies. https://qkss.org/en/publikimet/thyerja-e-miteve-te-isis-it-si-te-kunderveprohet-ndaj-narratives-se-isis-it-ne-internet-rasti-i-shteteve-shqip-folese/ 

• Kavanagh, C. (February 2021). Digital Technologies and Civil Conflicts. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_4_2021_0.pdf

• Kuloglija, N. (3 December 2021). Far-Right Exploiting Pandemic to Spread Hate, in the Balkans Too. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2021/12/03/far-right-exploiting-pandemic-to-spread-hate-in-the-balkans-too/

• Liang, C. and Cross, J. (July 2020). ‘White Crusade: How to Prevent Right-Wing Extremists from Exploiting the Internet.’ Geneva Centre for Security Policy. https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/white-crusade-how-to-prevent-right-wing-extremists-from-exploiting-the-internet.

• Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2011). As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awalki Became the Face of Western Jihad.  The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence.
  

• Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. (2011). As American as Apple Pie: How Anwar al-Awalki Became the Face of Western Jihad.  The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/ICSR-Report-As-American-As-Apple-Pie-How-Anwar-al-Awlaki-Became-the-Face-of-Western-Jihad.pdf  

• Mercy Corps. (December 2019).  Weaponization of Social Media. https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/weaponization-social-media 

• Providing European cities with tools to prevent radicalization. European Commission. https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/422621-providing-european-cities-with-tools-to-prevent-radicalization 

• Schmind, A. (July 2021). Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness. International Centre for Counter Terrorism. https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/10/V10.4-Handbook-ONLINE.pdf 
  

• Sonnemaker, T. (2020). Facebook reportedly had evidence that its algorithms were dividing people, but top executives killed or weakened proposed solutions.  Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-knew-algorithms-divided-users-execs-killed-fixes-report-2020-5 

• Twitter Public Policy, (2018). Expanding and building Twitter Transparency. https://blog.twitter.com/en us/topics/company/2018/twittertransparency-report-12.html

• United Nations Office on Counter-Terrorism. ‘Algorithims and Terrorism: Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence for Terrorist Purposes.’ (2021).  https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism/files/malicious-use-of-ai-uncct-unicri-report-hd.pdf 

• Von Behr, I. (2013) Radicalization in the digital era. The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism. RAND Europe. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf

• Weimann, G. (March 2004). How Modern Terrorism uses the Internet. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf 

• Weimann, G. “Terror on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 16, no. 2 (2010): 45–54.

• Westerlund, M. (2019). The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review, Technology Innovation Management Review, V. 9/11.  

• Wojcicki, S, 2017. Expanding our work against abuse of our platform, YouTube Official Blog, 4 December. Available at https://youtube.googleblog.com/2017/12/expanding-our-work-against-abuse-of-our.htm 

• YouTube User Statistics, 2022. Global Media Insights. 28 June 2022. https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/youtube-users-statistics/

Fake News and Hate Speech 

• Get Bad News Game. https://www.getbadnews.com/en/intro 

• Hate Speech and the Impact on Peace and Security. Global Network of Women’s Peacebuilders. https://gnwp.org/resources/covid-19-wps-database/increase-in-hate-speech-stigma-discrimination-or-xenophobia-2/ 

• Learn to Discern Media Literacy Training. IREX. https://www.irex.org/project/learn-discern-l2d-media-literacy-training 

• Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them. (February 2021). European Union Parliament https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653621/EXPO_STU(2020)653621_EN.pdf 

• Share Monitoring (2022). Balkan Investigative Reporting Network. https://monitoring.bird.tools/ 

PAVE Project Research

• Ayed, F. Azzam, L and Zouheir, B. (2022). Online and Offline (De)radicalization in the Balkans and MENA Region Synthesis Report. PAVE Project Publications. https://www.pave-project.eu/publications/PAVE_870769_D5.3_publication_layout.pdf 

• Ilazi,R. and Orana, A. (2022). Preventing and Addressing Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Framework. PAVE Project Publications. https://www.pave-project.eu/publications/PAVE_870769_Preventing_and_Adressing_Violent_Extremism_A_Conceptual_Framework.pdf 

• Ilazi,R. and Orana, A. (2022) Working paper on online and offline (de)radicalization in the Balkans. PAVE Project Publications. https://www.pave-project.eu/publications/PAVE%20D5.1%20Online%20and%20Offline%20(De)radicalization%20in%20the%20Balkans.pdf 

Session 2 Objectives and Expected Results

Objective: The second session will help you identify elements of an effective alternative or counter narrative campaign and guide you through developing your own.

Expected Results: The expected results of the second session will be that participants will have an introductory understanding on elements of a counter narrative campaign and how to create their own campaign based on their local context. 

Amount of Time Anticipated for Session 2: 1 hour and 30 minutes

Agenda for Session 2

• What Could An Extremist Narrative Look Like?
• How Can We Address Online Radicalization and Recruitment?
• What is Counter or Alternative Messaging and How Can it Be Used to Prevent Radicalization?
• Building a Strategic Campaign
• Guidelines for Creating an Effective Campaign 
• Mapping Your Target Audience
• How is Our Target Audience Currently Interacting with Extremist Content?
• How to Craft Your Counter or Alternative Message
• Tactics to Disseminate Your Campaign Messages 
• Your Counter or Alternative Narrative Campaign is Launched - Now What?
• Evaluating Your Counter or Alternative Narrative Campaign 
• Now It’s Your Turn to Make a Counter Narrative Campaign!

Extremist narratives can come in all forms ranging from bias, hate speech, marginalization and polarization. They can also build upon geo-political and ethno-religious conflicts embedded in a society or region. For example, online extremist propaganda in the Western Balkans exploits and draws on regional narratives and demographics. Many Western Balkans extremist ideologies, have followings across the region that correspond largely with linguistic lines—ethnic Albanian Salafi jihadist clerics from Kosovo also have an influence in Albanian language communities in Albania and North Macedonia, while supremacist Serbian nationalist narratives target Serb populations across Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. Such regionalized extremist narratives cannot be detached from legacies of conflict and longstanding interethnic tension within the region.

Extremist messages mix ideological, political, moral, religious and social narratives, based on narratives and stories conveyed with one dimensional interpretations of the world and seek to dehumanize the ‘enemy’ by diminishing human rights. 

What themes could extremists’ narratives center around look like? 

• Duty: You have a duty to protect, avenge, stand up for, defend those ‘on your side’, whether on humanitarian or religious grounds. 
• Victimhood: You, your family and friends are the victims of an aggressor or wider conspiracy, and you need to do something to stand up to it.  
• Religious Reward: God rewards those who fulfill their obligation to defend their religion and fellow believers. 
• Identity: You need to join the group to find where you really belong. You can become a part of our family.   
• Creating Purpose: Your day-to-day life is meaningless, so you need to find that meaning by joining our group. 
• Adventure: Joining up is fun, you will have access to weapons you can’t get and have exciting opportunities you want in your life. 

When selecting a counter narrative message, it is important to understand the messaging tactics of an extremist group. 

For example, a consultation hosted by Hedayah and the International Center for Counter Terrorism explored narratives of extremism.  The Al-Qaeda narrative tends to include messaging that:

1. That a cherished world is under threat;
2. It is obligatory to defend that world from contamination;
3. That the threat has reached a critical point or crisis;
4. That violence is the only way to overcome the threat/contamination;
5. That action is obligatory according to Islam; and
6. That those fighting for the cherished world will receive a heavenly reward for doing so.

We can also look at the ISIS narrative, which uses strong emotional messages, carried out through posting photos on Twitter and in Dabiq of their perceived successes and the atrocities of its enemies. ISIS has also developed a strategy for responding quickly to current events and using social media to recruit and radicalize. ISIS uses the Twitter app called the “Dawn of Glad Tidings” to inform its followers on the latest news of the group, and more importantly, create a synchronized Twitter counter narrative includes a framework for CVE in which designs counter and positive narrative campaigns through user accounts that are capable of sending thousands of tweets controlled by one or two media managers into cyberspace in an instant. This means that ISIS has mastered the ability to get the message out quickly, and with very little effort. 

To inspire and radicalize, extremists draw on common propaganda techniques, including: 

• Bandwagon: Encouraging their targets to fit in with the crowd; 
• Scapegoating: Blaming problems on a particular group; 
• Offering a “Choice”: Convincing targets that the “choice” being offered is the only rational one; 
• Affirmation: Presenting information as a fact when it is really open to interpretation;
• Transference: Applying feelings or views about one issue to another issue; and 
• Omission: Leaving out facts that would otherwise radically change the meaning of the message.

In response to prolific and successful Internet and social media mediated propaganda campaigns used by extremist and far-right groups around the world, international and intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union, as well as numerous civil society organizations are increasingly encouraging stakeholders to utilize both alternative and counter narratives as crucial tools in preventing and countering violent extremism. 

As outlined by a report for the Directorate General for Internal Policies at the European Commission, there are four key trends in current efforts to tackle terrorist propaganda:

• Disruption of propaganda distribution: The key objective is to interfere with the distribution of propaganda. In short, trying to stop propaganda at the source by preventing it from reaching its target audience. This has focused on taking down propaganda from social media and deleting offending accounts. 
• Redirect method: Rather than erasing propaganda, this approach seeks to redirect viewers to different messages in an attempt to ‘nudge’ their behavior. Pioneered by Jigsaw and Moonshot CVE tactics, this project redirects those searching for jihadist material to counter messaging.
• Campaign and message design: These projects seek to provide information and skills to civil society organizations to develop communication campaigns, typically based on counter narrative or alternative narrative approaches. Whilst disruption seeks to stop the spread of propaganda, this approach seeks to enable civil society organizations with the skills to confront and undermine the propaganda. 
• Government communications and synchronization of message and action: There is a tendency for communication campaigns to be designed in a vacuum, disconnected from events in real life. Synchronization approaches take a comprehensive perspective and aim to link messages and actions, and to coordinate messaging across government and with international partners. The strength of these approaches is to prevent the undermining of a narrative by exposing its ‘say-do-gap’, through ensuring message and actions are aligned, and through limiting contradictory messaging.

Counterterrorism and countering violent extremism strategic communications efforts across various programs and initiatives can be informed by the following recommendations: 

The term ‘counter-messaging’ has come to be used in relation to a wide range of communication activities. This can include everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by governments to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists by civil society. For the purpose of this module, we are going to look at government strategic narratives, alternative narratives and counter narratives. 

• Government Strategic Communications are led by government employees and exist to present government policy and strategy in a positive light; this may take the form of a public awareness campaign. 
• Alternative Narratives, which are undertaken by either government or civil society, aim to present a new narrative, rather than engaging on the same terms as the extremist content. This may include stories relating to diversity, or tolerance, or social values. 
• Counter Narratives, which are best used by civil society, directly tackle an extremist narrative in an attempt to discredit violent extremists’ messages.

Lets dig deeper: 

Alternative Narratives are used to undercut violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we as society are “for” rather than “against.” By using this type of messaging, you are not directly challenging extremist messaging, rather influencing those who might be sympathetic towards a cause or increase social cohesion through emphasizing commonality and inclusion.  

For example, the Extremely EUnited campaign targets the critical thinking skills of young people through videos, podcasts, art and other tools.  ‘I am a Full-Right Human Being,’ video produced for the campaign encourages youth to change their perspective and see how viewing things differently can change their outlook on life. The video showcases different perspectives of youth in Hungary about acceptance, diversity and inclusivity. Watch the video here: 

Source: Extremely EUnited. ‘’I Am a Full-Right Human Being.’’ June 16, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nmRxzsrmLSo.

Hear from Fabian Wichmann from Exit Germany and the Radicalization Awareness Network on what elements are needed to produce effective counter and alternative narratives. 

Source: PAVE Project. ‘’Fabian Wichmann: Elements Needed to Produce Effective Counter and Alternative Narratives.’’ 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rRD0RdkOR60.

1. What is the intent and purpose of that strategy?
2. How is that particular strategy being synchronized with other efforts?
3. What is the strategic logic underpinning that approach and what are its implications for practitioner mentality and team culture?

Also consider what your messaging goal intends to achieve. 

Are you trying to:

1. Deter individuals from exploiting digital platforms to inflict harm and committing acts of violent extremism.
2. Intervene with individuals who may pose a risk of violent extremism and encourage them to disengage. 
3. Prevent individuals from joining violent extremism groups and address the push and pull factors.
4. Build primary resilience to violent extremism radicalization.
5. Empower bystanders to prevent or counter violent extremism.

Strong alternative or counter narrative campaigns are underscored by the development of key skills within vulnerable communities, which include:

• Critical consumption skills, which help vulnerable communities to recognize and understand the use of propaganda techniques online; 
• Digital literacy skills, which help vulnerable communities to understand how the Internet works, how search engine results are generated, and how to use various online tools to refine their searches; 
• Media literacy skills, which allows vulnerable communities to question the intent of the media and protect themselves from any negative influence or response to media engagement; and
• Interpretation of extremist narratives to help those most at risk to understand the narrative techniques used by extremists and how to see through them. 

The PAVE project demonstrated an interconnected relationship between education and social media peer-group radicalization. Education and media literacy are seen as the overarching factor that hinders progress in addressing online peer-group radicalization.  Therefore, in understanding the nuances of vulnerability, PAVE researchers identified education, including media literacy, as a pillar for community resilience. This includes increasing programming to develop critical thinking skills among school students to decrease vulnerability. 

Strong alternative or counter narrative campaigns must also recognize and address misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation is false information, but not created or shared with the intention of causing harm. Disinformation is information that is deliberately created to mislead, harm, or manipulate a person, social group, organization, or country. For example, a lot of misinformation takes place through rumors. Rumors can take the form of fake news that spreads quickly on social media. When you hear or read a rumor that sounds true enough, you might send it along without double-checking if it's real, but you were not trying to cause harm. While those who knowingly spread rumors are sharing misinformation, those who start the rumors (or spread them with malicious intent) are guilty of providing disinformation. Whether the rumor takes place in a school or on the internet - if you know it's not true and you say it anyway, it's disinformation.

Misinformation and disinformation can spread fast, with adverse reactions that can impact communities. Here are seven items consider before sharing information: 

1. Consider the Source: Is this a well-known or trusted news outlet, and are they reputable for the subject at hand? 
2. Triple Check the Source: Check the name, logo, and “About” section to verify. 
3. Identify the Author: Misleading and false articles often do not include authors. If authors are listed, do a quick search to see if they are trusted sources. 
4. Inspect the URL: Web Pages that notoriously spread disinformation often have odd web domain names that try to imitate real sources (Example of an incorrect website address:  peacemakersnetwork.com.co) 
5. Examine Spelling and Punctuation: Webpages with misspelled words, unnecessary ALL CAPS, poor grammar, and excessive punctuation are often unreliable. 
6. Seek Alternative Viewpoints: Search for other articles and sources on the same topic. If there are limited or no results, or you find contradicting information, you may want to do further research and fact-checking. 
7. Think Before You Share: Damaging disinformation spreads quickly via shared posts. Emotional and sensitive topics are often used to manipulate readers into sharing without thinking. Review the above steps.

Test your observation and verification skills with this verification challenge: https://ftp.firstdraftnews.org/articulate/temp/ovcR/story_html5.html.  

Source: First Draft. ‘’Verifying Content, Online Language.’’ https://ftp.firstdraftnews.org/articulate/temp/ovcR/story_html5.html.

In order to map your target audience for your campaign, you must first examine the possible stakeholders. A stakeholder is a person or entity with an interest or concern in an issue area. The prevention of terrorism is a shared responsibility among individuals and communities at all levels. Stakeholders may help to drive attention to your campaign, offer advice, disseminate messages or just be an ally in advancing your goals and objectives.

So, who could be a stakeholder?

• Formerly radicalized individuals, or ‘formers.’ Formers can be credible messengers for a counter or alternative narrative campaign. ‘Formers’ are often well placed to discredit extremist propaganda, prevent radicalization, contribute to disengagement and deradicalization, and through reliance-building, support those who chose to leave a violent extremist movement. 
• Informal actors, such as family members, friends and neighbors. Individuals at risk of radicalization, or who are already radicalized, tend to receive messages better when they come from people from their direct social environment. Therefore, informal actors can be credible messengers for counter- and alternative narratives.
• Local communities. There is a wide acceptance amongst P/CVE practitioners that building meaningful relationships with local communities and working together on the problem is important. Not only online advertisements and political campaigns, for example, but also violent extremists are using more and more localized approaches. Where violent extremists try to exploit local vulnerabilities, efforts to counter or prevent this should try to leverage local resilience and fill the gaps where they are found.
• The voices of victims of terrorism. Their voices can be a powerful alternative to extremist narratives.
• The media. The media plays a big role in the communication of a certain narrative, especially after a highly sensitive moment like a terrorist attack.

 It is important to also consider your stakeholders familiarity with the topic and the ability to communicate without inadvertently producing unintended consequences for your campaign. For instance, ‘media’ can be a strong stakeholder that can help to create more external awareness around your campaign or messaging. However, PAVE research found that the media had been prone to incite radicalization through misinformation, poor editorial practices and sensational reporting. It is important to provide sensitivity training to mitigate any unintentional consequences.

Take a moment to think about who else in your community may be best positioned to champion your work!

After considering who your possible stakeholders are, you can then decide on who your target audience will be. For instance, people who you want to leave extremist organizations are very different from people who you want to prevent from joining extremist organizations. Think about those in communities that may identify as vulnerable to violent extremism. These communities could be geographically based (i.e. a local community in a country), or globally based (i.e. online, social media etc.). Don't forget that communities might also include those who feel connected to a war or conflict in a foreign country, regardless of the individuals’ country of origin or nationality.

Identifying the right target audience for a counter or alternative narrative campaign is the first important consideration. For example, you might want to: 

• Create a preventative campaign educating a broader audience. This could be targeted at parents, teachers, religious leaders or other members of civil society.  
• Reach a more specific age or gender group, such as young women aged 18-25, or teenagers aged 14-18 who are actively watching or searching for extremist content online.
• Influence members of online extremist groups or followers of known extremist accounts to deter from viewing and engaging with the content. 

Campaigns can attempt to reach more than one audience; however, it is important not to be too ambitious and try to reach everyone. Be as specific as possible when thinking about exactly who the right audience is. Once you have identified your target audience, you need to conduct a basic mapping to learn a bit more about them in order to craft and disseminate the most impactful messaging.

Questions to consider:

• Does my target audience fall under the “upstream,” “midstream,” “downstream,” or “bystander” approach?
• Where does your audience spend their time (both online and offline)?
• What do they value, or what do they see as morally good? 
• How do they communicate, or how do they use language?
• Who do they respect, or who else influences them? 
• Which campaigns are they already involved in?
• Which campaigns are already targeting them?

After identifying who your stakeholders and primary audience are, it is critical to think about who you should be partnering with to make your campaign as impactful and effective as possible within your community. It is only through engaging all of society that we can effectively eliminate radicalization.  Policy makers, faith leaders and institutions and civil society are three key groups that can play an imperative role to develop and implement a campaign. Remember, a multi-stakeholder approach is more likely to be effective and sustainable if the stakeholders involved have a common understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities and acknowledge their own strengths and limitations. Such an approach can bring together the entities and expertise necessary to effectively address the availability and accessibility of violent extremist and terrorist content on the Internet.

Your target audience’s engagement with extremist content may vary. Some may be an active online user and regularly engage with extremist content, while some may have never come in contact with it.  After understanding their level of engagement, you can identify in which your audience falls under the four following categories. Understanding where your target audience is positioned in relation to extremist narratives and recruitment tactics will help you determine the best message and delivery approach to reach your intended goal. 

Upstream: Upstream approaches are generally preventative and aimed at a broader audience. This can include building resilience to a violent extremist narrative or promoting social norms, such as the value of collective human identity. They can also focus on raising awareness or addressing widely-held grievances. For example, EXIT U.K.’s creation of short video stories addressed how day-to-day deprivations and grievances can be compounded and preyed upon by radical right extremist organizations.

Source: EXIT Hate UK.  https://exithate.org/?fbclid=IwAR1BKPESDGqANSq1NdVs6J3cxzOisfrfLtJW_Hj5p9Zwlkdhn53ZviaUv-I.

Midstream: Midstream approaches aim at a narrower group of individuals, typically those who are more at risk of radicalization, but not yet recruited to a violent extremist organization or radicalized violence. Methods within this approach include addressing vulnerabilities, building resilience, providing alternative narratives and pathways and undermining confidence in the group, ideology and its leaders. Example: Nigeria United Football team hosted a Facebook and offline campaign in Maiduguri for those vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment. The campaign showcased Muslim and Christian cooperation through football and facilitating football activities.

Downstream: Downstream approaches aim to directly rebut, refute or counter narratives of violent extremism or terrorist groups. They also aim to counter the justification, incitement, or glorification of terrorist acts. Multiple downstream campaigns have encouraged engagement with disengagement services.  

Example of Downstream Communication. Photo source: Moonshot, January 2021. “From Shitposting to Sedition.” https://moonshotteam.com/resource/from-shitposting-to-sedition-2020-us-elections-report/ .

Bystanders: Campaigns can also target the peer network or broader community (bystanders) that surrounds at-risk individuals. The aim is generally to encourage bystander interventions on an individual believed to be at risk of radicalization and/or recruitment. For example, the Stabilization Network Women in Syria Program CVE created online communities and spaces for vulnerable individuals and bystanders to interact safely within. The Stabilization Network’s Women in Syria Program created such a community which aimed to solidify an online community that was resilient to extremism and challenged some of the gender stereotypes found in extremist messaging. This group was highly active with up to 1000+ of user generated media per month. Having traditionally been left out of discussions about how to combat extremism, women reported feeling more confident in intervening to protect their children from violent extremist manipulation. As the content is user generated, these kinds of online communities are sustainable once the initial campaign has run its course. 

Once you’ve decided on your target audience and understand where they spend time, you need to craft a message that will best resonate with them - a message with a purpose! Whatever narrative you decide to use, make sure that you are able to make your message persuasive to help change or influence attitudes. In order to be successful, keep in mind that you are not talking TO your audience, rather, you are engaging WITH. 

No one wants to be told what to do or feel like they are being lectured or antagonized. People want to feel as though they are in a space to engage in dialogue and their own critical thinking. For example, creating a message that says “your belief is wrong” or “engaging with extremists is bad” without offering a positive alternative or a well-thought-out explanation is unlikely to have a strong or lasting impact. Consider also how you want your audience to react. Do you want them to see the message and personally reflect or bring awareness to a cause or issue? For instance, strategic messaging on social media communicated to the rest of the world what was happening on the ground during the Arab Spring uprisings. Or do you want your message to convey a “call to action”. A call to action asks audiences to do something immediately in response to your message and makes it clear why it is important. This could be as simple as getting them to share a video, sign a petition, or get involved more directly in the campaign or cause. Calls to action should be creative but also realistic.

For example, the Hours Against Hate was a US State Department-led campaign that aims to promote pluralism across society through offline social activism and online awareness-raising. The campaign urges youth to volunteer their time by pledging one hour to do something for someone different to them and encouraging others to do the same. 

Photo Source: Hours Against Hate. https://www.hoursagainsthate.com/.

So, what elements could your message include?

• Facts from credible sources to deconstruct, discredit and demystify extremist messages. This can include using community, religious, political or other influencers who are trusted by your target audience to share or reiterate the facts.
• Emotional appeals highlighting the impact of extremism and violence. For example, #NotAnotherBrother was a counter-speech campaign aimed to reach potential foreign terrorist fighters, and their networks, in order to dissuade from extremism and terrorism by challenging ISIS’ utopia narrative. Watch the campaign video here: .

Source: Not Another Brother. “#NotAnotherBrother.” August 3, 2015.  https://youtu.be/IjIQ0ctzyZE.

• Satire and humor to deglamorize and undermine the rebellious appeal of extremist groups.  For example, a project in Portugal under the name “No Hate Ninja’s’ produced a five-minute video: “No Hate Ninja Project – A Story About Cats, Unicorns and Hate Speech”, explaining why hate speech spreads so easily online and why that is a problem. Watch the campaign video here: https://www.coe.int/web/no-hate-campaign/videos1.

Now that you have identified your target audience and thought about how you will craft your message, we need to determine the best way to amplify your message to your target audiences. From your research, you should already know where your audience spends their time online and offline and how they consume information. Remember, audiences will not come to you - you need to go to them.  Make sure you are making it easy for them to see your campaign.

A counter or alternative narrative campaign could come from one or more mediums. Examples include: 

• Videos: Short films or animations
• Text: Slogans or hashtags
• Audio:  Podcasts or interviews
• Images: Photos or memes
• Online content: Social media posts, blogs, petitions or opinion pieces
• All forms of art or creative expression

GET CREATIVE!

For example, through comic books! Suleiman Bahkit is the creator of “Hero Factor,” a graphic novel about fighting terrorism. It competes with terrorist propaganda for its young audience’s attention. Terrorists often emphasize adventure, heroism, identity and history as tools of recruitment, as they know these are appealing factors to many young people. Suleiman Bahkit is also using these, but instead to fight extremism. “The number one reason that terrorists join a cause is to be heroes in their life. They want to matter, they want to be part of something bigger than themselves,” Bakhit says. “The only way to counter this is with stories that feature heroes based on hope, tolerance, gender equality and acceptance.”  His comic creations, featuring heroes such as Princess Heart and Element Zero, proved so popular that they are now being handed out to Jordanian schoolchildren as textbooks. Watch this video to learn more: 

Source: Wired UK. “Suleiman Bakhit: Fighting ISIS with Comic Books.” November 3, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5CSRDq_H7U.

You are not only trying to counter content coming from extremists, but also trying to break through the noise of all other content available on the internet. Whatever your content is, it needs to be attention grabbing. Your first sentence, photo or few seconds of video need to make your audience curious. 

Remember: No campaign will have the need or the resources to be on every social media platform! 

Reevaluate your Message

Continue to refer back to your original campaign plan to ensure your content stays on message, on budget and in the decided timeline. 

Audience Engagement

Engage with your audience even after you launched your campaign! This could be answering their questions, connecting them to additional resources, thanking them for participating or resharing their relevant content. You can also use surveys or audience feedback to know if your content is effective or if/how they have responded to your campaign.

Here are a few ways to bolster audience engagement with your content:

1. Engage in social listening. Find existing conversations online about your campaign or even the broader P/CVE space and join in on the conversation! This could include replying to posts, sharing resources in the comments section and even liking posts. 
2. Collaborate with relevant stakeholders. The more entities and people you collaborate with, especially with whom hold influence, the more likely your message will be seen by a larger audience. Encourage your collaborator to post and reshare your content and related information. 
3. If you have the capacity, set up a chatbot on your website to encourage live chat. Live chat has become a preferred method of communication for many users to get their questions answered. By also adding in the functionality of a chatbot, you’ll have the ability to immediately engage with your audience 24/7.
4. Get creative on your social media! Use the ‘live’ feature on Facebook and TikTok, set up quizzes and polls on Twitter or create a snapchat filter for audiences to use. There are lots of ways to be creative on common social media channels - all at little or no cost.
5. Add more visual content to your posts! Check out the stats on how visuals can enhance your content engagement:

Photo Source: 10 Ways to Boost Your Audience Engagement. AimTell. https://aimtell.com/blog/10-ways-engage-audience-boost-engagement

Evaluation is a critical but often neglected component of communication efforts. It provides valuable information about what is working and what is not so you can adjust your strategy for future engagements. Refer to the goals of the campaign that you formulated at the planning stage. The more clearly your goals are set, the easier it will be for you to evaluate your success. 

Checklist for evaluating your campaign based on the GAMMA+ Model:

Photo source:  RAN Network. (February 2017). Ex Post Paper RAN C&N meeting: How to measure the impact of your online counter or alternative narrative campaign. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2017-07/201702_ran_how_to_measure_impact_of_online_campaign_en.pdf

The monitoring and evaluation of your online counter narrative campaign will also be strongly based on the analytics identified on the platforms used during your campaign. Analytics can be used to determine how your message is (or is not) reaching and engaging with audiences. This includes analytics from social media, newsletters, websites or any other platforms used, as well as interviews with targeted audiences in a digital form (Survey Monkey, Google Forms) or in person (either formal, with a specific set of predetermined questions, or informal—seeking general feedback).

Scenario Exercise: 

A local community has struggled to regain socio-economic opportunities since the government collapsed. As a result, many youths have been skipping school and/or work and spend more time posting and scrolling on social media. Recently, it became public news that five youth (two girls, three boys) with ages ranging from 15-26 affirmed their allegiance to an extremist group. The local community has been grappling with the recent events and have worked with local authorities and community stakeholders to conduct an investigation to determine how the youth began interactions with extremist members and how they ultimately became radicalized and recruited by this group.

It was determined that the youth met the extremists on Facebook and from there, began regular communication over the past 10 months. In records of their chat, it appears that the extremists utilized language and cultural phenomena that appealed to the youth, including discussing the upcoming World Cup, expressing sentiments that school is a waste of time, and utilizing memes in which feature celebrities and influencers.

Community stakeholders, government and law enforcement do not have an efficient strategy for combating extremists and their engagement in online spaces. Therefore, as you are a leading youth empowerment organization in the community who has supported in CVE efforts, local officials have reached out to you to help them craft an effective counter narrative campaign to mitigate the number of youths who are radicalized and recruited online, recognizing that radicalization is an extremely nuanced process. You accept the task, excited for the opportunity to utilize innovative ideas to develop and disseminate powerful counter narratives with the goal to keep your community safe.

Creating a Counter Narrative Campaign 

• Bakrania, S. (August 2014). Strategic communications and foreign fighters. GDCRS Applied Knowledge Service. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/hdq1139.pdf 

• Briggs, R. and Feve, S. (2014). Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Countering%20the%20Appeal%20of%20Extremism%20Online-ISD%20Report.pdf 

• Comerford, M. and Dukic, S. (July 2020). Online Extremism: Challenges and Opportunities in the Western Balkans. Resolve Network. https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/2020-07/RSVE_PolicyNote_WB_ComerfordDukic_July2020.pdf

• Developing Effective counter narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism. (2014).  International Center for Counter-Terrorism. https://www.icct.nl/app/uploads/download/file/Developing%20Effective%20CN%20Frameworks_Hedayah_ICCT_Report_FINAL.pdf

• Ingrim, H. and Reed, A.  (2017) Lessons from History for Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications. International Centre for Counter Terrorism. https://icct.nl/publication/lessons-from-history-for-counter-terrorism-strategic-communications/

• Policy Brief: Drivers of Self- Radicalization and Digital Sociability. DARE Project. https://www.dare-h2020.org/uploads/1/2/1/7/12176018/d5.4_policy_brief_drivers_of_self-radicalization_and_digital_sociability.pdf 

• Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism. (2013). Rand Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf 

• RAN Network. (February 2017). Ex Post Paper RAN C&N meeting: How to measure the impact of your online counter or alternative narrative campaign. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2017-07/201702_ran_how_to_measure_impact_of_online_campaign_en.pdf 

• RAN Network. (July 2021). Special Overview: RAN Activities in Communications & (counter-)Narratives. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-07/ran_activities_in_cn_overview_paper_en.pdf

• Reed, A. Dr., Ingrim, H. Dr. and Whittaker, J. (2017). Countering Terrorist Narratives.  Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Commission. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596829/IPOL_STU(2017)596829_EN.pdf

• Ritzmann, A. (31 December 2017). RAN guidelines for effective alternative and counter narrative campaigns (GAMMMA+). RAN Network. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-09/ran_cn_guidelines_effective_alternative_counter_narrative_campaigns_31_12_2017_en.pdf

• Tuck, H. and Silverman, T. (2016). Counter Narrative Handbook. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/counter narrative-Handbook_1.pdf 

• We Can! Taking Action against Hate Speech through Counter and Alternative Narratives. (2017). Council of Europe. https://rm.coe.int/wecan-eng-final-23052017-web/168071ba08 

Monitoring and Evaluation

• Hedayah (2018). Evaluate your CVE Results. Projecting your Impact. http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-16720189339.pdf.  

• Radicalization Awareness Network (2017). How to measure the impact of your online counter- or alternative narrative campaign. RAN Ex post paper C&N, February 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/homeaffairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/docs/pages/201702_ran_how_to_measure_impact_of_online_campaign_en.pdf 

• Reynolds, L. and Tuck, H. (2016). The Counter Narrative Monitoring and Evaluation Handbook. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/CN-Monitoring-and-Evaluation-Handbook.pdf 

Session 3 Objectives and Expected Results

Objective: The third session will explore ways in which online users can stay safe when using online spaces and conducting counter or alternative narrative campaigns and other situations where they may be at risk for exploitation. 

Expected Results: The expected results of the third session will be that participants will have an introductory understanding of how to mitigate risks while using online platforms.  

Amount of Time Anticipated for Session: 30 minutes

Session 3 Agenda

• Being Safe When Using Online Spaces
• Safety Through An Inclusive lens
• What if Someone I know is Talking to an Unsafe Person?
• Key Considerations for Building Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration and Trust to Prevent Online Radicalization and Recruitment

Unfortunately, counter or alternative narrative campaigning can have security implications. Activities connected to countering violent extremism carry some degree of risk because of the subject matter and the audiences you may be targeting. Online activities could raise your profile and cause you to be targeted for your work. Avoid antagonizing or simply being controversial for the sake of it. Make sure you consider whether you need to take any safety measures to protect those working on or contributing to your campaign, including your messenger. If you plan to reach out to members of extreme groups, consider how sophisticated the extremist group is. Are they capable of identifying your involvement? Do you have contingency plans in place if you receive a direct threat online? Also remember, humor may be objective to the eye of the beholder and may be misunderstood. It is important to consider how your message can be misunderstood or misperceived by stakeholders.

When preparing a counter narrative, it is crucial that human rights values, principles and characteristics are ensured throughout the action. The oppressive narrative should not be combated by reproducing it or using other oppressive narratives.

So, what are common security concerns when creating a counter or alternative narrative campaign? 

Source: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. “The Counter Narrative Handbook’ Institute for Strategic Dialogue.” 2016. https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Counter-narrative-Handbook_1.pdf.

Staying Safe on Social Media

It is nearly impossible to completely rely on social media platforms to keep all of your information safe and to remove potential predatory accounts. Developers, IT workers, marketers, and countless other people can see even your most intimate messages and media. And because most of these companies store big data indefinitely, your conversations today or yesterday can still be threatened years in the future. 

It is becoming more common for adverse users to impersonate your profile, using your name, profile images and personal information.  When someone uses your images on fake profiles, others may attribute anything found on that profile to you. This could be in the forms of scams, fraudulent offers, pornographic material, requests for money, catfishing accounts, or online trolls. The worrying part is that all of these undesirable actions are under the umbrella of your face and image! 

Other fake accounts want to embarrass the person whose photos they’re stealing with hateful or disturbing comments. Families and relationships can be ripped apart when one spouse thinks another is cheating all because someone stole their partner’s identity on social media accounts!

What to do when someone created a fake account with your information? 

Contact the Website: While you could just immediately block the fake account, don’t. First, report the page or account to the website host. Explain that someone has created a fake account with your photographs/ images. If the site or app contacts you to verify your information, respond promptly.

Save the Fake Account’s Username or Link: Make sure that you cut/copy the link (if it’s a Facebook account, for instance) or the username for Instagram, Twitter, etc. That way you can search it out and see if the account has been removed.

Search: You can search your photographs through websites such as Berify or Google Images. This will scan the entire web and all major search engines. This can be helpful to see whether someone has created any other accounts. Once a scammer uses your photographs, they may set up multiple fake accounts and give you a web trail you didn’t intend. 

Here are 10 additional ways to your data safe:

1. Don’t share personal information
2. Double-check and verify links
3. Use secure public Wi-Fi
4. Use a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
5. Only log into sites that start with https://
6. Be careful who you chat with
7. Turn off your Bluetooth
8. Use antivirus software
9. Use secure passwords, meaning one that is hard for a user or program to try to guess. Try creating a complex, long password instead of using a birthday, anniversary, pet name, etc. 
10. Backup your data to prevent accidental data loss, corruption, and unauthorized access. 

Browse Safely and Anonymously 

Websites that you visit collect data such as demographics, intimate interests and tastes, personal habits and hobbies. This enormous amount of personal data could include sensitive information like credit card data, physical location, sexual preferences, religion, health and others. To mitigate data collection, browse anonymously online - this can include using HTTP encryption. Cookies are files created by websites you visit. They make your online experience easier by saving browsing information. With cookies, sites can keep you signed in, remember your site preferences, and give you locally relevant content. While you probably want to allow some of the useful cookies on shopping portals and other websites, it’s definitely a good idea to block all third-party cookies. Left unchecked, your cookies will feed personal data to private companies. Cookie settings can be changed directly in your browser settings.

Be conscious of potential risks in any given context online. One of the best things to ask yourself is “If this was hacked, how would it impact my life?” Thinking along these lines mean that YOU can dictate the security and privacy of your digital life. A majority of hacking incidents do not require highly technical skills. Malicious people often rely on simple schemes to trick people in giving up their information, including passwords, emails and other private information.  While we know that websites sometimes require you to enter information to gain access, think critically about what information is needed versus what information is too much. Don’t be afraid to make up information either! 

What about doxing? Doxing is a term derived from the phrase ‘document-sharing.’ Doxing is revealing personal or identifying documents or details online about someone without their consent. This can include personal information such as a person’s home address, real name, children’s names, phone numbers and email address. A violation of a person’s privacy, the aim of doxing is to distress, panic and otherwise cause alarm. 

Here are some tips to prevent hacking:

1. Do not login to websites from a link in an email
2. Always install software updates as soon as possible
3. Try not to login to websites via Facebook, Twitter, or Google
4. Do not trust emails asking for personal information, survey data, or anything else that could reveal info about you, no matter how professional they look.
5. Be careful using public Wi-Fi

Be aware of the presence of online ‘bots’. A bot, short for robot and also called an internet bot, is a computer program that operates as an agent (decision making entity) for a user or other program or to simulate a human activity. Bots are normally used to automate certain tasks, meaning they can run without specific instructions from humans. These may skew results and give a misleading picture of impact and reach.

How do I know if I am interacting with a bot? While it is not always possible to know, here are some signs that you may be interacting with a bot:

1. User profile: The most common way to tell if an account is fake is to check out the profile. The most rudimentary bots lack a photo, a link, or any bio. More sophisticated ones might use a photo stolen from the web, or an automatically generated account name.
2. Syntax: Using human language is still incredibly hard for machines. A bot’s posts may reveal its algorithmic logic - they may be formulaic or repetitive or use responses common in chatbot programs. Missing an obvious joke and rapidly changing the subject are other telltale traits (unfortunately, they are also quite common among human social media users).
3. Post semantics: Bots are usually created with a particular end in mind, so they may be overly obsessed with a particular topic, perhaps reposting the same link again and again or posting about little else.
4. Temporal behavior: Looking at tweets over time can also be revealing. If an account posts at an impossible rate, at unlikely times, or even too regularly, that can be a good sign that it’s fake. Researchers also found that fake accounts often betray an inconsistent attitude toward topics over time.
5. Network features: Network dynamics aren’t visible to most users, but they can reveal a lot about an account. Bots may follow only a few accounts or be followed by many other bots. The tone of a bot’s posts may also be incongruous with those of its connections, suggesting a lack of any real social interaction.

Watch out for your opponents!

There will be people who oppose your counter-narrative campaign and work. As a result, they may try to serve as a disrupter to your work, including through many of the ways listed above. It is essential to take specific safety measures to ensure your opponents cannot disrupt your campaign - or cause a safety concern to you and those around you. 

Photo Source:  Safety Net Project. ‘’Cyber Safety for Survivors of Domestic Violence.’’ https://www.techsafety.org/blog/2019/10/31/cyber-safety-for-survivors-of-domestic-violence.

Everyone has the right to use online platforms in a safe manner; however, the internet is often a platform for sexist, racist, homophobic and other violent types of behavior and content that disproportionately affects women and young women. An Amnesty International report found that women of color, women with disabilities, lesbian, bisexual, trans women and women at the intersection of forms of oppression are even more targeted. Violence and abuse against women and young women, including technology-facilitated abuse, is increasingly serving as a barrier to gender equality and may impact women’s work in areas that require a significant online presence, including politics, journalism or public advocacy.    

Women and young women may encounter: 

• Threats 
• Discrimination  
• Harassment
• Doxing
• Sharing sexual or private images without consent

More broadly speaking, youth also face a plethora of online risks that can impact both their psychological and physical safety. 

Three categories of risks could include:

Content risks

For youth, these risks include coming across material that they might find upsetting, disgusting or otherwise uncomfortable, especially if they encounter it accidentally including: pornography or sexually explicit content in music videos, movies or online games; real or simulated violence; hate sites; terrorist sites; fake news that seems believable; or harmful user-generated content like sites about drug use, self-harm, suicide or negative body image.

Contact risks

These risks include coming into contact with adults posing as children online, strangers who persuade teenagers to meet them in real life, and online scammers.

Conduct risks

Conduct risks include behaving in inappropriate or hurtful ways or being the victim of this kind of behavior. Examples include: cyberbullying; sexting; misusing people’s passwords and impersonating people online; making unauthorized purchases using other people’s financial details; creating content that reveals information about other people; or having trouble regulating online time, which can develop into problem internet use.

Every age group has unique vulnerabilities in addition to general Internet risks, and seniors are no exception. Few entirely new types of scams are created to target seniors; the issue lies in how existing scams are tailored specifically to exploit older Internet users. Though many seniors are very computer savvy, many more are not. Often their computers are not properly secured. Even when you have installed security software, it is critical that they set up automatic updates, turn on a firewall, use secure passwords, etc. If seniors are not comfortable setting up their computer, oftentimes, computer companies have trainings specifically designed for seniors to effectively set up their devices.

Seniors who use social networking sites that cater to older users are targeted with quizzes and surveys that often have very invasive questions about your health, wealth, and personal lives. Quizzes are created for revenue. Ask yourself who profits from you answering the questions and who else gets to see your answers. Understand that any information posted in these quizzes is likely to be used by many companies. Answer a medical quiz and you may find your insurance claims, even your ability to get insurance, are affected. Quizzes can also generate targeted spam ‘offers’ based on your answers.

Cyberbullying is not just a problem among young people; seniors are also affected. One clear difference is that, whether you want to face it or not, cyberbullying of seniors is most often done by family members. 

Cyberbullying of seniors can take several forms, but the most common are:

• Emotional abuse with rage, threats, accusations and belittling comments, often followed with periods of silence or ignoring the target.

• Financial abuse aimed at finding their account information, setting up online access to their accounts, and stealing their money.

All users need to be aware of contract risks, which include signing up for unfair contracts, terms or conditions that they aren’t aware of or don’t fully understand. Oftentimes, the elderly may be more susceptible to these scams.  As a result, users may: be open to identity theft or fraud; get inappropriate digital marketing messages or scam emails; or have their personal data collected from apps and devices like fitness trackers.

The process of radicalization can happen over a long period of time, or it can happen much quicker. There may be any given number of signs that someone is becoming radicalized, or it may be nearly impossible to spot. There is not a ‘one-size-fits-all” to understanding when, why and how someone may become radicalized. It is all relevant based on the individual. 

Signs that may indicate someone is being radicalized through internet platforms may include:

• Increase secretiveness, especially around internet use
• Changing online identity - or having multiple online identities
• Spending a lot of time on the internet
• Accessing extremist online content
• Isolating themselves from friends and family
• Unwillingness or inability to listen or discuss views or emotions
• Increased levels of irritability or anger, even feeling persecuted

It is important to reassure the person you are concerned for that they can trust you and that you are there to listen and support them. When we speak to children, we talk about finding a 'trusted adult'. Trusted doesn't necessarily mean a police officer or a teacher, but preferably someone whom that person can talk to in a free and uninhibited way – someone who can support them and guide them. It is also important to help them find advice and support in understanding distressing events and feelings. Trust is also crucial when it comes to helping adults – although it can be more difficult to cultivate. Signposting people to counseling and support groups, where they can talk openly and honestly without judgment, can be an important first step.

Check out your local resources. Communities may have organizations or government offices that can ensure the individual receives the support and guidance they need to deradicalize.  

Photo Source: Lord, Kristin and Katya Vogt. ‘’Strengthen Media Literacy to Win the Fight Against Misinformation.’’ March 18, 2021. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/strengthen_media_literacy_to_win_the_fight_against_misinformation.

What Can I Do to Prevent Someone from Being Groomed or Radicalized Online? Educate!

Decreasing online vulnerability for recruitment and radicalization will only be effective if there is increased multi-stakeholder collaboration at the local, national and regional level.  This is especially necessary as in most instances, governments are not effective messengers for counter or alternative narrative efforts; they lack credibility among the target audiences and may be slow to respond due to bureaucratic constraints. Therefore, civil society, including faith actors and institutions, are a key mechanism to prevent online radicalization and recruitment. 

Continuity in the fight against radicalization and recruitment  is required from politicians in financing education and prevention projects, especially by supporting civil society initiatives. For example, the federal program Living Democracy!, run by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth in Germany, encourages communities to take action against hate on the internet, in addition to other efforts to promote democracy. Furthermore, information and education campaigns, on social media and in schools, universities and businesses are needed to reduce the consequences of online and offline discrimination. Increased literacy skills amongst civil society and policy makers will help to build awareness of violent extremism and the role of media. 

This includes providing sensitivity training to media personnel to safely report on sensitive subjects and to ‘do not harm,’ within their reporting.  Subsequently, this will support awareness raising on  how reporting practices can support P/CVE efforts and prevent stigmatization of groups that hinder responses to violent extremism. This includes increasing their capacity on how to report on gender, faith communities, young people and other minority groups with more sensitivity to ensure no adverse consequences fall on these communities and mitigate the “us vs. them” persona.  There are many tools around the world which support citizen activism in identifying and reporting hate speech. 

Civil society and faith actors can advocate for the increased engagement of policy actors in this space and support legislation and accountability mechanisms to mitigate hate speech, extremist propaganda and violence. The PAVE project research did conclude that not all policy makers see the value in such legislation or even recognize there is a problem in the online space. There is a need to better understand this phenomenon and develop strategies to address them.

Policy makers and members of civil society must acknowledge and increase the meaningful engagement of women and youth in P/CVE efforts, especially in an online space. For example, the No Hate Speech Campaign is a youth campaign led by the Council of Europe Youth Department in Germany that seeks to mobilize young people to combat hate speech and promote human rights online. The official No Hate Speech Movement video explains the rationale of the campaign by providing examples of hate speech online and personal testimonies of young people. The video concludes with a short explanation of the main features of the campaign platform. https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign/videos1.

Photo Source: No Hate Speech Youth Campaign Movement. (2022). Council of Europe. https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign. 

There are also many other ways for these multi-stakeholder groups to collaborate beyond counter or alternative narratives. The DARE project has provided recommendations to advance dialogue between stakeholders outside of disseminating counter or alternative narratives or removing online content: 

• Consider the use of educational toolkits. Awareness, courage, accountability and empathy, i.e. the skills required to promote moderation, need to be acquired by social media users through training. The use of educational toolkits can contribute to this. 

• Experiment with diversity and promote online contact between diverging views. Many initiatives show how bringing together different viewpoints can have a constructive effect in the real world, but online initiatives attempting to do the same are currently lagging. The Erasmus+ online platform that brings together youth from all sides of the Mediterranean can be considered a good practice in this context.

Many stakeholders are doing incredible work around the world on P/CVE efforts. However, there still remains coordination gaps in which are inhibiting stakeholders to collaboratively work together and strengthen/build upon their P/CVE efforts. Collaboration between state institutions, civil society and faith communities is strongly encouraged to increase resilience factors to radicalization and recruitment in online spaces.

Staying Safe Online 

• ADL Cyber-Safety Action Guide. Anti-Defamation League. https://www.adl.org/cyber-safety-action-guide#.VsiigPmLQgs 

• Feminist Principles of the Internet. https://feministinternet.org/en

• Keeping Safe: How to Spot and Prevent Online Grooming and Radicalization. (2022). British Council. https://www.britishcouncil.org/anyone-anywhere/explore/dark-side-web/online-grooming-radicalisatio

•  Knight, W. (2018). How to Tell if you are Interacting with a Bot? MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/07/18/141414/how-to-tell-if-youre-talking-to-a-bot/

• Safe Sisters Guide. Safe Sisters. https://safesisters.org/resources/

• Surveillance Self-Defense: Tips, Tools and How-Tos for Safer Online Communities. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://ssd.eff.org/ 

• Take Back the Tech. https://takebackthetech.net/ 

• What Do You Need to Protect? Security in a Box. https://securityinabox.org/en/ 

Pave Research

• Policy Briefs: Drivers of Self-Radicalization and Digital Sociability. (2021). DARE Project. https://www.dare-h2020.org/uploads/1/2/1/7/12176018/d5.4_policy_brief_drivers_of_self-radicalization_and_digital_sociability.pdf 

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